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Theoretical and empirical work suggests that commercial loan officers play a critical 
role in relationship lending by producing soft information about their SME borrowers.  We 
test whether loan officers in the Japanese SME loan market perform this role in a manner that 
is consistent with the theoretical predictions in the relationship lending literature.    While we 
find limited evidence that soft information may benefit SME borrowers, we do not find 
evidence that is on balance consistent with theoretical predictions that loan officers produce 
soft information that is not easily transmitted to others within the bank.  These results are 
consistent with alternative explanations including the possibility that the social environment 
in Japan leads to a credit culture where it is easier to transmit soft information from one loan 
officer to another.  It could also be consistent with the possibility that the relationship 
lending may not be particularly important in the Japanese SME loan market. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent literature on SME financing has emphasized the dichotomy between soft 
information and hard information.  Specifically, this literature has identified soft 
information with “relationship lending” and hard information with “transactions lending”.  
In contrast to hard information which is easily quantified, soft information is not easily 
quantified and consists of information gathered over time through contact with the firm, the 
firm’s management/entrepreneur, the firm’s suppliers and customers, and other local sources.   
Examples of soft information include assessments of managerial skill and valuation of 
intangible assets. 
Another key hypothesized distinction between soft and hard information – and between 
relationship lending and transactions lending – is the primacy of the loan officer in the 
collection of soft information and the delivery of relationship lending.  Within the 
theoretical framework of relationship lending the loan officer is responsible for collecting 
soft information about his/her customers and using that information to make decisions about 
new credit extensions, renewals, renegotiations and terminations.  The primacy of the loan 
officer is quite explicit in many recent models of relationship lending (e.g., Stein 2002, 
Berger and Udell 2002, Liberati and Mian 2006).  A key reason for this is the assumption 
that soft information deteriorates as it is transmitted to others within the institution and this 
deterioration may be exacerbated by the hierarchical nature of the institution (e.g., Becker 
and Murphy 1992, Radner 1993, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, and Garicano 2000).    Thus, 
the retention of soft information is maximized when it is deployed by the same individual that 
generated the information, i.e., the loan officer him/herself. 
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Despite its importance there is relatively little research on the role played by the loan 
officer in relationship lending.  Nevertheless, the theoretical work on relationship suggests 
some clear and interesting empirical implications.  In particular if the loan officer plays an 
important role in relationship lending, then we would expect to see a link between loan 
officer attributes and loan officer underwriting activities, and the production of soft 
information.    For example, we would expect to see an association between the skill level of 
loan officers and the production of soft information.  Moreover, we also expect to see that 
this accumulation of soft information by the loan officer matters with respect to the terms and 
availability of credit.  Empirical support for these predictions would constitute evidence 
supporting the theoretical work that argues that relationship lending is a distinct lending 
technology that it is principally extruded through the accumulation of soft information by the 
loan officer. 
In order to analyze the role of loan officers in relationship lending, we utilize a new and 
unique data set based on survey data of Japanese SMEs, the Management Survey of 
Corporate Finance Issues in the Kansai Area.    This survey was conducted in Japan in June 
2005 and contains data about firms and their loan officers based on a questionnaire sent to 
SMEs in the Kansai area of Japan.    From these data we construct an index that measures the 
accumulation of soft information in a manner similar to recent research on relationship 
lending (Scott 2004).     
Using this index, we conduct two sets of analysis.  First, as our main analysis, we 
examine whether loan officer attributes that proxy for skill (e.g., loan officer turnover, loan 
officer age) and loan officer lending activities (e.g., frequency of meeting and method of 
contact) affect the production (i.e., accumulation) of soft information.  This analysis asks 
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HOW soft information is produced.     
Second, we test whether this accumulation of soft information matters – does the 
accumulation of soft information matter in terms of different measures of relationship 
benefits?  Even if we find in the first stage that loan officer attributes and/or loan officer 
lending activities matter in accumulating soft information, the finding is irrelevant unless the 
accumulation leads to a material benefit.    We address this in our second stage. 
Our  two stage analysis is also distinct as a “benefit analysis” of the bank-borrower 
relationship.  Although there are abundant studies on the benefits that stem from banking 
relationships, they tend to focus on potentially imprecise proxies for relationship closeness 
such as the length and scope of the relationship that do not measure the extent to which soft 
information is accumulated (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell 1995).  
Typically these studies rely on a presumption that closer relationships represented by these 
proxies lead to more accumulation of soft information which, in turn, benefits the borrower.    
We depart from this approach by decomposing the link between relationship closeness and 
borrower benefits into two stages, and directly test (1) whether close relationships lead to 
more accumulation of soft information, and (2) whether the accumulated soft information is 
beneficial.    
By way of preview, we find limited evidence that soft information may benefit SME 
borrowers, but we do not find evidence that is on balance consistent with theoretical 
predictions that loan officers produce soft information that is not easily transmitted to others 
within the bank.  These results are consistent with alternative explanations including the 
possibility that the social environment in Japan leads to a credit culture where it is easier to 
transmit soft information from one loan officer to another.  It could also be consistent with 
 5  
the possibility the relationship lending may not be particularly important in the Japanese 
SME loan market. 
The remaining part of this paper is composed as follows.  In the next section, we briefly 
discuss the related theoretical and empirical literature.  In section 3 we introduce our data.  
Section 4 presents our methodology and section 5 presents our results.  The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature 
2.1 Relationship lending 
Our paper is most closely related to the growing literature on relationship lending.  
Beginning in 1990s academic research on SME financing began to examine the underwriting 
process associated with commercial lending.  This research explored more precisely how 
financial institutions extend credit to their customers and, more specifically, how they 
mitigate the informational wedge between themselves and their borrowers.  Much of this 
literature has focused on one particular type of lending, relationship lending.    Later research 
has broadened the scope of the analysis by viewing relationship lending as one of potentially 
many lending technologies. A lending technology can be defined as a combination of 
screening mechanisms, contract elements, and monitoring strategies (Berger and Udell 2006). 
This newer strand of the literature argues that there are a variety of different lending 
technologies that exist in at least some countries in the world.  In addition to relationship 
lending, the literature has identified financial statement lending, fixed asset lending, factoring, 
leasing, small business credit scoring, and trade credit as alternative lending technologies 
(Berger and Udell 2002, 2006).  With the possible exception of trade credit, all of these 
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alternative lending technologies are transactions-based technologies where underwriting is 
primarily based on hard information.
1    While many of these transactions-based technologies 
can be used to provide credit under special circumstances to opaque SMEs, relationship 
lending (the only lending technology based on soft information) is still, nevertheless, one of 
the most important lending technologies, particularly for SMEs that do not have audited 
financial statements or sufficient pledgeable collateral.  It may also be relatively more 
important for SMEs in countries like Japan where some of the alternative lending 
technologies are not available, particularly asset-based lending.
2  
Theoretical work on relationship lending has emphasized that the underwriting process 
associated with this technology involves the production of private, soft information about 
borrowers (e.g., Rajan 1992, Petersen and Rajan 1995).  This soft information is acquired 
through contact over time with the SME and often with its owner and members of the local 
community” (Berger and Udell 2006).  It can include assessments of a borrower’s future 
prospects culled from contact with borrower’s suppliers, customers, competitors, or 
neighboring businesses (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Mester et al., 
1998; Degryse and van Cayseele, 2000).  The empirical evidence on relationship lending 
suggests that the strength of the bank-borrower relationship is positively related to credit 
availability and credit terms (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998). 
 
2.2 The role of loan officers 
                                                  
1  See Uchida, Udell and Watanable (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the trade credit literature. 
2 Asset-based lending comprises about 25% of all commercial lending in the U.S. (Berger and Udell 
2006). 
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As we have noted above, however, theoretical work has argued that the production of 
soft information flows through the bank loan officer.  In this sense the bank-borrower 
relationship in SME lending can better be described as the loan officer-entrepreneur 
relationship (see Berger and Udell 2002).  In this context our paper touches on another 
strand of literature, the transmission of information within organizations.  This literature 
emphasizes that the transmission of soft information within organizations will be lost the 
further it needs to be transmitted within the organizations, i.e., the more hierarchical layers of 
the organization through which the information is transmitted (e.g., Becker and Murphy 1992, 
Radner 1993, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, and Garicano 2000). 
This paradigm has some specific implications for the relationship lending.    It suggests 
that the loan officer, as the initial producer of soft information about SME borrowers, is 
critical to the process.    To the extent that lending decisions are delegated to the loan officer 
then the loss of valuable soft information will be minimized.  When agents who are vested 
with the responsibility of collecting soft information do not make the credit decisions their 
incentive to expend effort to collect this information may be compromised (Aghion and 
Tirole 1997, Stein 2002).  In addition, this problem becomes exacerbated for larger and 
more complex financial institutions (Stein 2002, Liberti and Mian 2006).  Empirical 
evidence indeed suggests that as lending decisions pass through more layers of organization 
(away from the loan officer), the importance of soft information is diminished (Liberti and 
Mian 2006).  Thus, this paradigm which emphasizes the primacy of the loan officer in 
relationship lending, has a clear implication: the loan officer’s capacity to collect soft 
information will materially affect the amount of soft information that is collected.  Stated 
another way, if loan officers are the primary conduit for the production of soft information as 
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suggested by this paradigm, then factors that inhibit loan officers from collecting soft 
information should lead to less accumulation of soft information.    The accumulation of less 
information should also be associated with less credit availability.  Testing these 
propositions is the focus of this paper. 
 
2.3 Empirical evidence on the role of loan officers 
Despite the theoretical primacy of the loan officer in relationship lending, there has 
been very little empirical research on the importance of loan officers in lending relationships.   
In general, the empirical research on relationship lending does not make a distinction 
between the bank and the loan officer.  One interesting – though limited – exception is a 
paper that examined the effect of banking industry consolidation in the U.S. on SME access 
to credit (Scott and Dunkelberg 1999).  These authors included in their analysis a measure 
of loan officer turnover as measured by the number of bank account managers that an SME 
had over the past 3 years.  Interestingly their analysis indicated that loan officer turnover 
was negatively related to credit availability and positively related to the SME searching for a 
new bank.    These results can be viewed as support for the relationship lending paradigm that 
emphasizes the primacy of the loan officer. 
The only other studies with which we are familiar that analyze lending at the loan 
officer level provide only limited evidence on the role of loan officers in relationship lending.   
One study explored the agency problem associated with the bank-loan officer contract (Udell 
1989).  This study found evidence that banks that delegate more responsibility to their loan 
officers invest more in monitoring their loan officers.  Given evidence elsewhere that 
decision-making at the loan officer level is likely to be more soft information intensive 
(Liberti and Mian 2006), this is suggestive that banks that delegate more authority to their 
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loan officers may engage in more relationship lending.  Finally,  there  is some work that has 
shown that even though merging banks in the U.S. may contract their supply of lending in 
their local markets, other banks, particularly de novo banks, compensate by increasing their 
SME lending.    This research is consistent with anecdotal evidence in the financial press that 
loan officers who are terminated when consolidated banks merge, start new banks and take 
their relationship borrowers with them (Berger et al. 1998, Goldberg and White 1998, 
DeYoung 1998). 
Our paper is closest to the work of Scott and Dunkelberg (2004) who use data on SME 
lending from a survey of small businesses conducted by the National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB) in the U.S.    Like their work, we examine loan officer turnover 
as a key independent variable.  However, our analysis is quite different on several other 
dimensions.    First, we examine a number of different characteristics related to the role of the 
loan officer that Scott and Dunkelberg were not able to investigate with the NFIB database.  
These include the age of the loan officer, frequency of meetings with the loan officer, meeting 
venue and the distance between the bank and the borrower.  Second, we depart from their 
approach by decomposing the link between loan officer turnover and borrower benefits into 
two stages, and directly test (1) whether loan officer attributes/activities lead to accumulation 
of soft information, and (2) whether the accumulated soft information is beneficial.  Third, 
we analyze loan officers and relationship lending in the Japanese context.  Research on 
SME lending in Japan has been considerably less than in the U.S.  Finally, we are to a 
certain extent able to control for situations where loan underwriting was conducted using a 
lending technology other than relationship lending.    For example, we are able to control for 
whether audited financial statements were used in the underwriting process indicating the 
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deployment of the financial statement lending technology – one of the transactions-based 
lending technologies that are an alternative to relationship lending. 
 
3. Data   
Our analysis utilizes the Management Survey of Corporate Finance Issues in the Kansai 
Area, which was conducted in June 2005 by the Regional Finance Workshop in the Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI).    The survey, hereafter the RIETI survey, 
asks SMEs about firm characteristics, management strategy, bank relationships, the loan 
screening process, and access to credit.  The distribution, collection, and data aggregation of 
the survey were outsourced to Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR), a credit reporting and 
information provision company in Japan.  Questionnaires were sent out by hard mail to 
9,000 firms in three prefectures, Osaka, Hyogo, and Kyoto, in Kansai area in Japan.
3  These 
firms were chosen from those in TSR’s database.  In proportion to the relative size of 
prefectural product and the number of enterprises in the prefectures, 5,000 firms were chosen 
from Osaka prefecture, 2,500 firms were from Hyogo prefecture, and 1,500 firms were from 
Kyoto prefecture.  In each prefecture, firms were evenly selected from four employee-size 
categories, 1) 1 to 20 persons, 2) 21 to 50 persons, 3) 51 to 100 persons, and 4) more than 
                                                  
3 Kansai area is located in the middle of the main island of Japan, and the three prefectures form the 
focal point for the economy of western Japan.  Osaka is the second largest prefecture in Japan with 
population of 8,814 (as of October 1, 2004).    Its capital, Osaka, is the second biggest business center 
in Japan.  The Osaka prefecture is known to have numerous SMEs.  Hyogo prefecture has 
population of 5,587 (October 1, 2004).  The capital city Kobe is well-known as an international port 
with numerous port-related industries such as steel production and shipbuilding, although the economy 
around the city is still rebuilding after the devastating Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in 1995.  The 
population of the Kyoto prefecture is 2,638 (October 1, 2004).    Its capital is the historic city of Kyoto.   
There are a large number of traditional industries in the Kyoto prefecture such as traditional handcrafts 
and textiles.  There are also considerable amounts of high-tech industry located in the Kyoto 
prefecture. 
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100 persons.  For example, in Osaka prefecture, 1250 = 5000 / 4 firms were randomly 
chosen from firms with 1 to 20 employees.   
2041 responses (by hard mail) were received yielding a response rate of 22.7%.  The 
number of effective responses was 2020.    We further eliminate firms for which main bank is 
not one of seven types producing a sample of 1700 firms.
4  The sample firms’ industries 
include Construction (12.5% of the sample firms), Manufacturing (34.5%), Wholesale 
(19.7%), Retail (5.9%), Services (12.0%), and others (14.3%).
5  The average sample firm 
was established in 1967, employs 150 persons, has a capitalization of 764 million yen, and 
has 1.19 billion yen of sales. 
 
4. Methodology 
Our analysis focuses on two main questions.  First, is the loan officer critical to the 
process of generating soft information?  Second, is the generation and accumulation of soft 
information a significant factor in determining an SME’s access to credit?  In some sense 
the answer to these questions also sheds light on a more fundamental question: Is relationship 
lending an important lending technology in the Japanese bank loan market?    If the answer to 
the first two questions is positive, this suggests that the answer to the latter question is also 
affirmative. 
 
4.1 Production of soft information 
The first question is investigated by estimating an equation which takes the form: 
                                                  
4  The included firms had a main bank that was either a city bank, a long-term credit bank, a trust bank, 
a regional bank, a second regional bank, a Shinkin bank, or a credit cooperative.    See below for more 
details. 
5 Firms in Agriculture, Fisheries, Electricity, Gas, Finance, Insurance, Medicare, and Education 
industries were excluded in advance before the questionnaires were sent out. 
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The accumulation of soft information = f (loan officer attributes/capacity, firm and   
entrepreneur control variables, access to hard information,   
regional and bank controls)               ( 1 )  
 
Dependent variable 
With regard to the dependent variable in equation (1), we note that soft information is 
information that is difficult to document and transfer.  It is the information that relationship 
lending is primarily based on.  By definition, we cannot quantify soft information.  To 
overcome this problem we develop an index to capture the extent to which the bank knows 
the firm in terms of soft information.  This is similar to the index used in recent work on 
relationship lending.  Specifically we use 6 of the 11 characteristics of lenders’ knowledge 
from the RIETI survey that mirror the composition of Scott’s (2004) index (see Data 
Appendix A-1).  The 11 characteristics reflect how respondent firms rated their lender’s 
knowledge about the borrower.    Six of the 11 characteristics are related to soft information: 
characteristics no. 1 through 6.
6    Using these six characteristics and following a similar 
procedure to Scott (2004), we created our measure of soft information production SOFT.
7
 
                                                  
6  Instead of six characteristics, the CBSB survey contains four soft-information-related characteristics 
that reflect the SME’s view of its bank: “knows you and your business,” “knows your industry,” 
“knows the local market and/or community,” and “social contact with loan officer.”  The 
characteristics we have used (Data Appendix A-2) are elaborations on them. 
7 The survey asks (1) how important the firm rates each of the 11 characteristics in doing business 
with a financial institution (in general) based on a 5-point scale from “1” (very important) to “5” (not 
important).    This captures the firm’s perception of what it defines as a good lender.   For each of the 
11 characteristics, the firms are also asked to evaluate (2) to what extent the current main bank 
performs satisfactorily on a 5-point scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad).    This captures the firm’s 
evaluation of the current main bank.    For each of the six characteristics related to soft information, we 
constructed a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the firm chose 1 for both questions (1) 
and (2).    SOFT is the first principal component of the principal component analysis over the resulting 
six dummies.   
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Key independent variables 
Our key independent variables for equation (1) are measures that reflect the capacity of 
loan officers to generate soft information – our loan officer attributes/capacity variables.  
These include three measures directly related to the loan officer him/herself: 
NOTURNOVER, which indicates whether there was no turnover of loan officers in the past 
three years; NOOFFICER, which indicates whether there is no specific officer at all in the 
past three years; and, OFFICER20_30 indicating if the loan officer is in his/her 20s or 30s.  
These are our three most important loan officer variables.    They can be viewed as measuring 
the ability of the officer to establish a close relationship and accumulate soft information.  
Frequent loan officer turnover and/or the absence of a specific loan officer should inhibit the 
production of soft information and younger loan officers (who would likely be more junior) 
should be less able to produce soft information.    The coefficients on these variables reflect a 
direct test of whether loan officers are critical to the production of soft information.  Note 
that the expected sign of the coefficient of NOTURNOVER is positive, whereas those of 
NOOFFICER and OFFICER20_30 are negative.   
Additional variables that have been hypothesized in the literature to have an impact on 
the ability of loan officers to produce soft information are: the length of the main bank 
relationship (LENGTH); the distance in terms of more than 30 minutes travel to the borrower 
from the bank (DISTANT); the frequency of contact with the bank, i.e., the average interval 
of firm-bank contact (FREQUENCY); whether the loan officer typically meets the 
entrepreneur at his/her place of business (rather than at the bank branch) (MEETPLACE); 
and, finally, whether contact with the borrower is typically direct rather than by telephone, 
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email or other indirect methods (CONTACTMODE).
8  We expect positive signs for the 
coefficients of LENGTH, MEETPLACE, and CONTACTMODE, while a negative sign for 
that of DISTANT and FREQUENCY. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics of these variables and Table 2 presents the frequency 
distribution for these variables.  Officer turnover is relatively common in Japan.  About 
89% of the firms experienced at least one turnover in the past three years.  Also, more than 
96% of the firms have a specific loan officer.    About 70% of loan officers were in the 20s or 
in the 30s.   
The average length of the bank-borrower relationship is quite long at nearly 27 years.  
This is much longer than that in the US.  It is interesting to observe that the banking 
relationship is very long, while officer turnover is relatively frequent and thus the loan 
officer-entrepreneur relationship is quite short.  To the extent that the loan officer is 
paramount in importance with respect to the production of the soft information, this suggests 
that high loan officer turnover may be an inhibiting factor in the Japanese market.   
The mean of 0.1467 for DISTANT implies that 85% of the firms locate within 30 
minutes of distance from a main bank branch.  The 30.0 mean for FREQUENCY indicates 
that the entrepreneur and the loan officer usually meet once a month.  The .786 mean for 
MEETPLACE indicates that for almost 80% of the firm the primary meeting place is the 
business which would be more conducive to the production of soft information than meeting 
at the bank.  Finally, about half of the contact between entrepreneurs and loan officers is 
direct (i.e., CONTACTMODE = .54). 
 
                                                  
8 For a more detailed discussion of the research that has utilized these variables see Berger et al. 
(2005) and Berger and Udell (2006).   
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Other control variables 
We also control for whether the bank has hard information about the firm in terms of 
audited financial statements (AUDIT).    This variable will control for borrowers whose loans 
may be underwritten using the financial statement lending technology (i.e., for financial 
statement borrowers). 
We also control for characteristics of the firm including financial performance, the 
firm’s industry, the firm’s entrepreneur, bank characteristics, and the firm’s region.  The 
labels and definitions for these variables are in Data Appendix A-2.     
 
4.2 Soft information and relationship benefit 
In our second stage analysis of whether the accumulation of soft information is 
beneficial we estimate the following equation: 
 
Benefit from relationship = f (accumulation of soft information, firm and   
entrepreneur control variables, access to hard information,   
regional  and  bank  controls)             (2) 
 
Dependent variable 
In our second stage we use a dependent variable that captures the benefit of soft 
information produced in relationship lending.    We use six alternative proxies to represent the 
benefit.  The first two capture firm’s access to credit.  The variable, TIGHT, is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the firm answered “hard” to the following question on the RIETI 
survey: “How did you feel about [how hard it was to obtain] financing in the past one year?”  
We also use a variable, EASY, which is a mirror image of TIGHT, which takes a value of 1 if 
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the firm answered “easy” to the question above. 
We also use four other variables.  A variable STABLE is a multi-nominal variable 
constructed from the firm’s answer to the following question: “With respect to the stable 
provision of funds, to what extent does the current main bank perform satisfactorily?” The 
respondent firm chooses an answer on a 5-point scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad).  
STABLE thus takes a value from one to five.  The other three multi-nominal variables are 
similarly defined.    QUICK is constructed from the question "With respect to quick decision 
making,”; BROAD is from the question "With respect to the provision of a broad range of 
services,”; and INEXPENSIVE is from the question "With respect to the provision of 
inexpensive funds.”  Note that by construction, a greater benefit is represented with a 
smaller value of these variables. 
 
Independent variables 
In this second stage of the analysis, the key independent variable is our index of the 
accumulation of soft information, SOFT, which was used as the dependent variable in 
equation (1).  We would expect that the accumulation of more soft information would lead 
to improvements in the “benefit” proxies explained above, i.e., the coefficient on SOFT is 
hypothesized to be negative for TIGHT, STABLE, QUICK, BROAD, and INEXPENSIVE, 
while positive for EASY. 
To isolate the effect from SOFT, we use different control variables.    They are the same 
as those used in the first stage. 
 
5. Results 
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5.1 Soft information production 
The results for the first stage of our analysis, equation (1), are shown in column (1) of 
Table 3.
9   Turning first to the key independent variables that measure loan officer 
capacity/attributes (our measures of the closeness of the loan officer-entrepreneur relationship 
and the ability of the loan officer to accumulate soft information) we find a significant and 
negative coefficient on NOOFFICER.  This result indicates that less soft information may 
be collected when there is no specific officer.    This is consistent with the primacy of the loan 
officer and with the hypothesis that loan officers collect soft information.  In contrast, 
NOTURNOVER is not significant.    The result on NOTURNOVER is particularly important 
because it, more than any of our other explanatory variables, gets to the heart of the primacy 
of the loan officer in delivering relationship lending.  The difficulty of transmission is the 
essence of soft information.  That is, by definition, from theory, and from empirical 
evidence soft information is difficult to transmit (Stein 2002, Liberti and Mian 2006).
10  
Thus a finding of no significance on NOTURNOVER is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
production of soft information.  OFFICER20_30 is not significant either, so that the 
officer’s expertise in terms of his/her age is not important in producing soft information.  
This could be construed also as being inconsistent with relationship lending to the extent that 
skill level is important in acquiring soft information.       
The results for some of the other variables tend to be consistent with the hypothesis that 
loan officers acquire soft information.  The result of a negatively significant coefficient of 
                                                  
9 The results using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown, because the White 
test rejected the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity at a 1 percent level of significance.   
10  The definition used for soft information used in Berger and Udell (2002) is typical: “soft 
information may not be easily observed by others, verified by others, or transmitted to others.”    Thus, 
the difficulty in transmitting soft information is its very essence.   
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FREQUENCY means that the longer the time interval between meetings becomes (i.e. the 
less frequent they meet), the less soft information is produced.  CONTACTMODE is 
positively significant, which indicates that in-person contact is important in producing 
soft-information.    However, neither distance nor the length of the relationship is statistically 
significant, which is inconsistent with numerous studies that have found that a longer length 
and broader relationship provides more benefit. 
Turning to other variables, the positive and significant coefficient on UNION suggests 
that smaller banks may produce more soft information than large banks (= default), which is 
consistent with prior literature that smaller banks may emphasize relationship lending (e.g., 
Cole, Goldberg and White 2004, Berger et al. 2005).  The coefficients on regional banks 
(REGIONAL) are also significant and positive, which is also consistent with prior literature.   
However, the coefficient of REGIONAL is greater than that of UNION, which contradicts the 
theoretical prediction.   
Also of interest is the statistical insignificance on the variable AUDIT which indicates 
whether the borrower has audited financial statements.    This suggests that the accumulation 
of soft information is no less (or no more) when there is hard verifiable information about the 
firm.  The only variable that is unambiguously consistent with the importance and 
production of soft information is the negative and significant coefficient on the number of 
employees which suggests that less soft information is accumulated by the bank on its larger 
borrowers. 
On balance our results can best be viewed as inconsistent with loan officers in Japan 
collecting soft information that cannot be transmitted to other loan officers.  Our results 
would seem to be more consistent with loan officers accumulating information that can be 
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transferred (i.e., hard or quasi-hard information) that is dependent on having a specific loan 
officer, and a loan officer that frequently contacts the borrower in a direct manner. 
To explore these issues further we examine some potentially interesting interactions that 
better capture the theoretical predictions about the primacy of the loan officer.    In particular, 
we examine interactions of our loan officer capacity/attributes variables (i.e., loan 
office-entrepreneur closeness variables) with bank type dummies, REGIONAL and UNION 
(see column (2) in Table 4).
11  We would expect that a strong loan officer-entrepreneur 
relationship would be most important for smallest banks that have the least complex 
organizational structure (UNION = 1) and least important for the largest banks with the most 
complex organizational structure (LARGE = 1, default).  This allows in particular for the 
possibility that the primacy of the loan officer only matters in small banks where the 
problems associated with deterioration in the transmission of soft information internally are 
minimized (Becker and Murphy 1992, Radner 1993, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, and 
Garicano 2000, Stein 2002, Liberati and Mian 2006). 
Looking at the coefficients on the UNION interactions we see little evidence to support 
the primacy of the loan officer in the accumulation of soft information.  Specifically, none 
of the interactions are significant.    In contrast, in the case of regional banks, FREQUENCY 
further contributes to the accumulation of soft information.  Thus the evidence is also not 
generally consistent with the theoretical predictions from the theory of relationship lending 
and soft information production.    However, since UNION and REGIONAL were significant 
on a stand-alone basis, it is quite possible that there is some mechanism, other than that 
captured by our proxies, with which banks with simple organizational structures are good at 
                                                  
11  Again, the standard errors are White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.    The White test 
rejected the null hypothesis at a 5 percent level of significance. 
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accumulating information.   
 
5.2 Benefit from soft information accumulation 
Now turning to the second stage of our analysis we investigate whether the accumulation 
of soft information as measured by our index is actually beneficial.  On balance we found 
evidence inconsistent with loan officers accumulating soft information.  However, the 
evidence was still somewhat ambiguous.  One particular result argues that some soft 
information is accumulated in that the existence of loan officers may play a critical role in the 
production and accumulation of soft information in the Japanese SME loan market.  It may 
also be possible that some soft information could be passed on from one loan officer to 
another without too much deterioration of information if it were not passed through 
hierarchical channels but rather directly from one officer to another within a branch for 
instance.  This might occur as part of a systematic loan officer rotation system.  Allowing 
for the possibility that some soft information is accumulated by loan officers, we now 
investigate whether the accumulation leads to any benefit for the SME.     
Our key test here is equation (2) with regression results shown in Table 4 through Table 9.   
These tables correspond to our alternative measures of relationship benefit:  TIGHT (Table 
4), EASY (Table 5), STABLE (Table 6), QUICK (Table 7), BROAD (Table 8), and 
INEXPENSIVE (Table 9).  Our key explanatory variables in the regression are SOFT and 
the interaction of SOFT with dummies for regional banks and Shinkin banks (and other 
co-operative banks).  Again SOFT is our measure of the accumulation of soft information.  
We argue that this is a direct measure of the accumulation of soft information than 
relationship length.    The interactions are included to allow for the possibility that the benefit 
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from soft information accumulation may differ by bank complexity. 
First turning to the three variables that measure the relationship benefit in terms of credit 
availability – TIGHT, EASY and STABLE – only STABLE is statistically significant.  On 
balance this casts some doubt on the accumulation of soft information being beneficial.  
Turning next to our measure of loan price, INEXPENSIVE we see that it is significant in the 
predicted direction.  This is consistent with findings elsewhere that loan rates decline with 
relationship strength (e.g., Berger and Udell 1995).    However, unlike other analysis we use a 
direct measure of the accumulation of soft information.     
With respect to our two other measures of relationship benefits, QUICK and BROAD, 
both are statistically significant and consistent with soft information providing a benefit (i.e., 
a negative sign).  These two variables, however, are likely to be less important to 
entrepreneurs than the credit availability and price variables. 
With respect to the interaction variables, neither are significant in any regression.  This 
means that there is no difference among bank types in the extent to which the accumulation 
of soft information brings benefits 
Taken together it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the benefits from the 
accumulation of soft information in Japan.  While our pricing regression shows a benefit, 
two out of three of our credit availability regressions do not.     
 
6. Conclusion 
Taken together the results from the first and second stages of our analysis present a bit of 
a puzzle.  On balance our first stage results are mostly inconsistent with loan officers in 
Japan collecting soft information that cannot be transmitted to other loan officers.    A critical 
 22  
finding here is that soft information production does not deteriorate with higher loan officer 
turnover.  However, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that loan officers collect 
some soft information and pass this on to other loan officers in a systematic loan officer 
rotation cycle.  The extent to which soft information is lost during this exchange is beyond 
the scope of our analysis but theoretical and empirical work elsewhere would predict this loss 
to be significant.    To the extent that this turnover occurs at the branch level and/or involves 
direct contact between the “new” and “old” during the transfer information deterioration may 
be attenuated.   
In our second stage result we found some evidence that soft information is valuable in the 
sense that it provides some benefit to SMEs.  However, this result appears to be mostly 
limited to lower interest rates and not to credit availability.    Moreover, the benefit from soft 
information production does not appear to be greater for smaller banks as predicted by 
theoretical and empirical work on relationship lending elsewhere in the literature. 
Thus, on balance our results are not consistent with the general view literature that loan 
officers produce soft information that cannot be easily transmitted and that this leads to 
greater credit availability for borrowers.  We do not believe that our findings are driven by 
an insufficiently powerful methodology or data limitations.  We note that methodologically 
our analysis compares favorably with other empirical work.  Many of the variables used in 
our study are identical (or nearly identical) to those used elsewhere in the literature.  
Moreover, our measure for the production of soft information is direct while in most 
empirical work soft information production is only indirectly proxied.  Thus, we feel 
relatively confident that our results are not driven by an inferior methodological approach. 
Our mixed results suggest several interpretations.  First, the view found in the current 
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research literature that emphasizes that the primary conduit for the collection of soft 
information is the loan officer may not be valid.   This interpretation, however, runs counter 
to a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical evidence.   
Second, the Japanese loan market may be different from loan markets elsewhere.  It 
may be possible in the Japanese context that loan officers who are younger, who operate at 
longer distance from their borrowers, and who are newer to the account are just as able to 
produce soft information as other loan officers are.  This may be related to the social 
environment which has been linked in the literature to potential differences across countries 
in SME access to credit (Berger and Udell 2006).  Specifically it has been shown that the 
level of social capital and trust may be important in facilitating the writing and enforcement 
of financial contracts and related to differences across countries in terms of entrepreneurial 
activity (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004).  By extension the social environment 
could be an important factor in driving differences between credit cultures in banks across 
countries.  If these differences affect the rate at which soft information deteriorates as it is 
transmitted through hierarchies within banking organizations – or transmitted from one loan 
officer to another – then this could explain the differences in our results for the Japanese 
SME loan market and results found elsewhere. 
Another interpretation of our results is that relationship lending and the accumulation of 
soft information may not be particularly important in the Japanese loan market.  This 
interpretation is consistent with a recent article on Japanese credit markets that argues that 
banks may not be particularly good relationship lenders in the sense of being good 
Diamond-like delegated monitors (Miwa and Ramseyer 2005).  This article further argues 
that trade creditors have an advantage over banks in screening and monitoring borrowers.  
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Other recent research on Japanese credit markets provides some corroborating evidence that 
trade credits in Japan may be relationship lenders (Uchida, Udell and Watanabe 2006).    Our 
results in this paper could be viewed as consistent with the view that banks are not the 
superior relationship lenders although we do not directly compare the two creditors.   
Although our analysis improves on existing methodology on several dimensions, our 
findings still leave room for multiple interpretations and raise a number of interesting 
questions about loan officers and relationship lending in the Japanese SME commercial loan 
market.    It is clear that more research is needed on this issue. 
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Data Appendix   
A-1    Characteristics of lender’s knowledge about the borrower 
1. Knows your business (the firm itself and its business) 
2. Knows your managers and owners (the firm's managers and owners) 
3. Knows your industry (the firm's industry) 
4. Knows the local community (the local community the firm is in) 
5. Know the market (the firm's market) 
6. Social contact with loan officer (loan officer has frequent contact with the firm) 
7. Stable provision of funds 
8. Quick decision making 
9. Provision of broad services 
10. Provision of inexpensive money 
11. Good location 
 
A-2  Definitions  of  Control  Variables 
[Bank size/complexity] 
LARGE (dummy: default) 
The lending bank is either a city bank, a long-term credit bank, or a trust bank 
REGIONAL (dummy) 
The lending bank is a regional bank or a second-tier regional bank 
UNION (dummy) 
The lending bank is a Shinkin bank or a credit cooperative 
 




[Firm's qualitative performance information] 
PERFORMANCE_SS (dummy: default) 
Performance of the firm in the past two years (Surplus->Surplus) 
PERFORMANCE_DS (dummy) 
Performance of the firm in the past two years (Deficit->Surplus) 
PERFORMANCE_SD (dummy) 
Performance of the firm in the past two years (Surplus->Deficit) 
PERFORMANCE_DD (dummy)   
Performance of the firm in the past two years (Deficit->Deficit) 
NODIVIDEND (dummy) 
The firm did not pay dividend last year 
 
[Firm's characteristics] 




The number of employee 
LISTED (dummy) 




The CEO has a house 
CEOAGE 




















Urban Osaka area (the area code of the telephone number is 06) 
KOBE 
Urban Kobe area (the area code of the telephone number is 078) 
KYOTO 
Urban Kyoto area (the area code of the telephone number is 075) 
 
[Bank competition dummies] 
VISITINC_OTHER 
Contact increased with other banks 
VISITINC_PA 
Contact increased with a loan officer 
 30 N  Mean  Median Min. Max.  Std. Dev.  Sum
NOTURNOVER 1642 0.0743 0 0 1 0.2623 122
NOOFFICER 1642 0.0378 0 0 1 0.1907 62
OFFICER20_30 1592 0.6313 1 0 1 0.4826 1005
LENGTH 1558 26.8787 27 0 109 16.2745 41877
DISTANT 1670 0.1467 0 0 1 0.3539 245
FREQUENCY 1576 30.0006 15 0 365 48.2688 47281
MEETPLACE 1612 0.7860 1 0 1 0.4103 1267
CONTACTMODE 1628 0.5412 1 0 1 0.4985 881
Table 1.  Summary Statistics on Loan Officer Capacity/AttributesCharacteristics Options Frequency
Frequency
distribution
Officer turnover No turnover 122 7.430
Once 528 32.156
Twice 513 31.242
More than three times 417 25.396
No officer 62 3.776
Total 1642 100






Time distance 10 or less 669 40.060
(minutes) 30 or less 756 45.269
60 or less 209 12.515
120 or less 29 1.737
over 120 7 0.419
Total 1670 100
Meet place At the company 1267 78.598
At bank branch 316 19.603
Other 29 1.799
Total 1612 100
Mode of contact In person 881 54.115
Tel or fax 699 42.936
E-mail 21 1.290
IT tool (other than e-m 16 0.983
Other 11 0.676
Total 1628 100
Table 2.  Frequency distribution of Relationship ClosenessCoefficient Std. Error Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Intercept -2.4364 *** 0.4793 0.0000 -2.2174 *** 0.4973 0.0000
OFFICER_TURN 0.0390 0.1327 0.7691 0.0180 0.1330 0.8926
NOOFFICER -0.3081 ** 0.1403 0.0284 -0.2394 ** 0.1029 0.0202
OFFICER20_30 -0.0073 0.0852 0.9320 -0.1045 0.0954 0.2734
LENGTH 0.0023 0.0020 0.2628 0.0008 0.0022 0.6995
DISTANT 0.0880 0.0888 0.3220 0.0846 0.0905 0.3503
FREQUENCY -0.0019 *** 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0015 *** 0.0005 0.0013
MEETPLACE 0.1264 * 0.0767 0.0996 0.1235 0.0858 0.1503
CONTACTMODE 0.1450 ** 0.0643 0.0244 0.1438 ** 0.0696 0.0391
OFFICER_TURN *REGIONAL -0.2712 0.3353 0.4189
OFFICER_AGE *REGIONAL 0.2430 0.1992 0.2227
LENGTH *REGIONAL 0.0017 0.0059 0.7774
TIME_DISTANCE *REGIONAL 0.1426 0.3759 0.7046
FREQUENCY *REGIONAL -0.0117 *** 0.0041 0.0041
MEETPLACE *REGIONAL -0.0874 0.2476 0.7241
CONTACTMODE *REGIONAL -0.0180 0.2078 0.9308
OFFICER_TURN *UNION
OFFICER_AGE *UNION 0.1808 0.2111 0.3920
LENGTH *UNION 0.0084 0.0058 0.1478
TIME_DISTANCE *UNION -0.3235 0.3063 0.2912
FREQUENCY *UNION -0.0012 0.0029 0.6767
MEETPLACE *UNION 0.1780 0.1811 0.3259
CONTACTMODE *UNION 0.0324 0.2152 0.8804
REGIONAL 0.3953 *** 0.1208 0.0011 0.4590 0.3230 0.1556
UNION 0.2447 ** 0.1141 0.0322 -0.1945 0.2809 0.4889
AUDIT 0.0507 0.1068 0.6350 0.0496 0.1071 0.6438
LOG(ASSET) 0.1811 *** 0.0418 0.0000 0.1751 *** 0.0427 0.0000
PERFORMANCE_DS 0.0494 0.0992 0.6190 0.0570 0.1018 0.5756
PERFORMANCE_SD -0.0646 0.1370 0.6374 -0.0706 0.1401 0.6146
PERFORMANCE_DD 0.5061 ** 0.2226 0.0232 0.5138 ** 0.2270 0.0239
NODIVIDEND 0.1209 * 0.0727 0.0966 0.1113 0.0745 0.1357
FIRMAGE 0.0040 0.0060 0.5045 0.0028 0.0061 0.6475
FIRMAGE^2 -0.0001 0.0001 0.4385 0.0000 0.0001 0.6280
LOG(EMPLOYEE) -0.0877 * 0.0495 0.0765 -0.0905 * 0.0500 0.0705
LISTED -0.2622 0.2430 0.2808 -0.2401 0.2345 0.3060
HOMEOWNER 0.0735 0.1429 0.6069 0.0650 0.1389 0.6399
CEOAGE 0.0038 0.0037 0.3054 0.0041 0.0037 0.2755
OSAKA 0.0587 0.0767 0.4443 0.0607 0.0800 0.4480
KOBE -0.1458 0.1197 0.2236 -0.1402 0.1203 0.2445
KYOTO -0.0263 0.1074 0.8067 -0.0371 0.1130 0.7429
CONST 0.0853 0.1711 0.6182 0.0700 0.1729 0.6857
MANUFAC -0.2309 * 0.1324 0.0814 -0.2400 * 0.1329 0.0713
WHOLE -0.1788 0.1381 0.1955 -0.1767 0.1402 0.2079
RETAIL 0.1128 0.2051 0.5826 0.1098 0.2084 0.5983
REALEST 0.3637 0.3357 0.2790 0.3994 0.3467 0.2497
RESTAU_HOTEL -0.2957 0.1965 0.1328 -0.2849 0.1970 0.1485
SERVICES -0.0926 0.1467 0.5283 -0.0853 0.1487 0.5663
VISITINC_OTHER -0.0001 0.0694 0.9983 -0.0219 0.0696 0.7530
VISITINC_PA 0.0373 0.0908 0.6811 0.0531 0.0917 0.5630
Adjusted R-squared 0.0690 0.0703
Number of observations 970 970
Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level. Standard errors are
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors.
Variable
Table 3.  Soft Information Production
(Dependent variable = SOFT, Least Squares Estimation)
(2) (1)Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Intercept -1.2328 * 0.6763 0.0683 -1.2283 * 0.6787 0.0703
REGIONAL 0.0974 0.1375 0.4785 0.0721 0.1401 0.6066
UNION 0.5011 *** 0.1404 0.0004 0.5080 *** 0.1407 0.0003
SOFT 0.0519 0.0470 0.2693 0.0049 0.0704 0.9449
SOFT*REGIONAL 0.1191 0.1034 0.2494
SOFT*UNION 0.0249 0.1255 0.8426
AUDIT 0.1677 0.1531 0.2734 0.1719 0.1532 0.2617
LOG(ASSET) -0.0389 0.0591 0.5105 -0.0378 0.0595 0.5256
PERFORMANCE_DS 0.4571 *** 0.1494 0.0022 0.4524 *** 0.1499 0.0025
PERFORMANCE_SD 0.3143 * 0.1716 0.0670 0.3128 * 0.1715 0.0681
PERFORMANCE_DD 0.9704 *** 0.1860 0.0000 0.9813 *** 0.1864 0.0000
NODIVIDEND 0.8136 *** 0.1215 0.0000 0.8142 *** 0.1216 0.0000
FIRMAGE 0.0053 0.0120 0.6598 0.0044 0.0121 0.7163
FIRMAGE^2 0.0000 0.0001 0.7954 0.0000 0.0002 0.8366
LOG(EMPLOYEE) -0.0110 0.0744 0.8820 -0.0092 0.0745 0.9019
LISTED -0.4901 0.4416 0.2671 -0.5062 0.4427 0.2528
HOMEOWNER -0.1448 0.2230 0.5162 -0.1453 0.2226 0.5139
CEOAGE 0.0030 0.0052 0.5651 0.0030 0.0052 0.5665
OSAKA -0.0680 0.1183 0.5655 -0.0703 0.1183 0.5526
KOBE -0.1863 0.1897 0.3261 -0.1830 0.1897 0.3348
KYOTO -0.1784 0.1623 0.2716 -0.1718 0.1629 0.2915
CONST 0.1225 0.2201 0.5779 0.1160 0.2206 0.5989
MANUFAC -0.0463 0.1888 0.8063 -0.0530 0.1893 0.7795
WHOLE -0.2175 0.2092 0.2984 -0.2162 0.2095 0.3020
RETAIL 0.1920 0.2476 0.4382 0.1855 0.2484 0.4553
REALEST -0.4780 0.4751 0.3143 -0.5104 0.4813 0.2889
RESTAU_HOTEL 0.1085 0.3923 0.7821 0.0992 0.3921 0.8003
SERVICES 0.0715 0.2198 0.7449 0.0620 0.2201 0.7782
VISITINC_OTHER 0.0285 0.1045 0.7847 0.0233 0.1047 0.8240
VISITINC_PA -0.1540 0.1458 0.2911 -0.1502 0.1460 0.3036
Number of observations 1050 1050
Table 4.  Benefit from Soft Information Production
(Dependent variable = TIGHT, Probit estimation)
Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
㩿㪈㪀 㩿㪉㪀Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Intercept -1.2872 ** 0.5759 0.0254 -1.3072 ** 0.5771 0.0235
REGIONAL -0.1304 0.1169 0.2644 -0.1186 0.1180 0.3149
UNION -0.3048 ** 0.1377 0.0268 -0.3116 ** 0.1382 0.0242
SOFT 0.0465 0.0417 0.2655 0.0539 0.0566 0.3417
SOFT*REGIONAL -0.0450 0.0918 0.6239
SOFT*UNION 0.0453 0.1203 0.7063
AUDIT 0.0994 0.1284 0.4387 0.0972 0.1286 0.4496
LOG(ASSET) 0.1281 ** 0.0511 0.0121 0.1298 ** 0.0512 0.0113
PERFORMANCE_DS -0.3029 ** 0.1461 0.0382 -0.2985 ** 0.1464 0.0414
PERFORMANCE_SD -0.4216 ** 0.1750 0.0160 -0.4170 ** 0.1752 0.0173
PERFORMANCE_DD -0.6061 *** 0.2044 0.0030 -0.6128 *** 0.2047 0.0028
NODIVIDEND -0.4809 *** 0.0933 0.0000 -0.4822 *** 0.0933 0.0000
FIRMAGE 0.0021 0.0088 0.8127 0.0021 0.0089 0.8104
FIRMAGE^2 0.0000 0.0001 0.7549 0.0000 0.0001 0.7513
LOG(EMPLOYEE) -0.1014 0.0631 0.1085 -0.1033 0.0632 0.1023
LISTED 0.0915 0.2317 0.6930 0.0938 0.2321 0.6860
HOMEOWNER 0.0725 0.1850 0.6949 0.0711 0.1848 0.7004
CEOAGE 0.0037 0.0043 0.3939 0.0038 0.0043 0.3728
OSAKA -0.0291 0.1017 0.7750 -0.0292 0.1017 0.7739
KOBE 0.0366 0.1577 0.8167 0.0385 0.1577 0.8069
KYOTO -0.0292 0.1338 0.8270 -0.0355 0.1341 0.7910
CONST -0.3583 * 0.1975 0.0696 -0.3603 0.1977 0.0683
MANUFAC 0.0758 0.1632 0.6424 0.0742 0.1635 0.6502
WHOLE 0.0939 0.1747 0.5909 0.0897 0.1750 0.6082
RETAIL -0.1724 0.2281 0.4497 -0.1782 0.2290 0.4365
REALEST 0.1345 0.3577 0.7070 0.1443 0.3577 0.6866
RESTAU_HOTEL -0.0706 0.3463 0.8385 -0.0658 0.3464 0.8492
SERVICES -0.0754 0.1941 0.6976 -0.0731 0.1943 0.7067
VISITINC_OTHER 0.0523 0.0870 0.5477 0.0550 0.0871 0.5277
VISITINC_PA 0.2086 * 0.1170 0.0746 0.2058 0.1171 0.0788
Number of observations 1070 1070
Table 5.  Benefit from Soft Information Production
(Dependent variable = EASY)
Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
㩿㪈㪀 㩿㪉㪀Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Intercept 3.5720 *** 0.3498 0.0000 3.5525 *** 0.3504 0.0000
REGIONAL -0.3050 *** 0.0716 0.0000 -0.3029 *** 0.0723 0.0000
UNION -0.3142 *** 0.0814 0.0001 -0.3174 *** 0.0816 0.0001
SOFT -0.2573 *** 0.0259 0.0000 -0.2797 *** 0.0356 0.0000
SOFT*REGIONAL 0.0275 0.0568 0.6280
SOFT*UNION 0.0839 0.0729 0.2495
AUDIT -0.0063 0.0778 0.9356 -0.0038 0.0779 0.9614
LOG(ASSET) -0.0968 *** 0.0309 0.0018 -0.0940 *** 0.0310 0.0025
PERFORMANCE_DS 0.1862 ** 0.0877 0.0340 0.1897 ** 0.0879 0.0311
PERFORMANCE_SD 0.1263 0.1000 0.2069 0.1297 0.1001 0.1955
PERFORMANCE_DD 0.1750 0.1112 0.1158 0.1696 0.1114 0.1283
NODIVIDEND 0.0925 0.0586 0.1150 0.0914 0.0587 0.1194
FIRMAGE -0.0079 0.0054 0.1389 -0.0086 0.0054 0.1131
FIRMAGE^2 0.0001 0.0001 0.3420 0.0001 0.0001 0.3038
LOG(EMPLOYEE) -0.0336 0.0381 0.3782 -0.0349 0.0381 0.3611
LISTED 0.0813 0.1434 0.5709 0.0785 0.1435 0.5842
HOMEOWNER 0.1424 0.1146 0.2145 0.1449 0.1147 0.2066
CEOAGE 0.0036 0.0027 0.1716 0.0038 0.0027 0.1579
OSAKA -0.1681 *** 0.0622 0.0070 -0.1677 *** 0.0622 0.0071
KOBE -0.1262 0.0961 0.1897 -0.1229 0.0962 0.2018
KYOTO -0.0387 0.0811 0.6337 -0.0415 0.0813 0.6097
CONST 0.0399 0.1187 0.7368 0.0327 0.1189 0.7835
MANUFAC -0.2571 ** 0.1003 0.0105 -0.2652 *** 0.1005 0.0085
WHOLE -0.2125 ** 0.1075 0.0484 -0.2178 ** 0.1077 0.0434
RETAIL -0.0127 0.1364 0.9258 -0.0252 0.1369 0.8540
REALEST -0.0575 0.2235 0.7971 -0.0567 0.2237 0.8000
RESTAU_HOTEL -0.3660 * 0.2118 0.0843 -0.3673 * 0.2119 0.0833
SERVICES -0.1699 0.1182 0.1507 -0.1729 0.1183 0.1440
VISITINC_OTHER -0.0012 0.0532 0.9821 -0.0010 0.0533 0.9856
VISITINC_PA -0.2743 *** 0.0731 0.0002 -0.2755 *** 0.0732 0.0002
Adjusted R-squared 0.2017 0.2012
Number of 1057 1057
Table 6.  Benefit from Soft Information Production
(Dependent variable = STABLE, Ordinary Least Squares)
Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
㩿㪈㪀 㩿㪉㪀Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Intercept 3.1786 *** 0.3697 0.0000 3.1378 *** 0.3700 0.0000
REGIONAL -0.2007 *** 0.0760 0.0084 -0.1896 ** 0.0766 0.0134
UNION -0.3769 *** 0.0865 0.0000 -0.3860 *** 0.0866 0.0000
SOFT -0.2881 *** 0.0274 0.0000 -0.3125 *** 0.0376 0.0000
SOFT*REGIONAL 0.0023 0.0601 0.9689
SOFT*UNION 0.1467 * 0.0771 0.0574
AUDIT 0.0062 0.0824 0.9397 0.0084 0.0824 0.9184
LOG(ASSET) -0.0654 ** 0.0327 0.0455 -0.0603 * 0.0327 0.0657
PERFORMANCE_DS 0.1631 * 0.0929 0.0795 0.1718 * 0.0929 0.0648
PERFORMANCE_SD -0.0199 0.1059 0.8508 -0.0115 0.1059 0.9132
PERFORMANCE_DD 0.1425 0.1177 0.2263 0.1295 0.1178 0.2719
NODIVIDEND 0.1067 * 0.0621 0.0864 0.1046 * 0.0621 0.0925
FIRMAGE -0.0161 *** 0.0056 0.0046 -0.0169 *** 0.0057 0.0030
FIRMAGE^2 0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.0020 0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.0014
LOG(EMPLOYEE) 0.0016 0.0404 0.9685 -0.0016 0.0404 0.9675
LISTED 0.0415 0.1516 0.7842 0.0393 0.1515 0.7955
HOMEOWNER 0.1107 0.1214 0.3621 0.1134 0.1213 0.3502
CEOAGE 0.0025 0.0028 0.3673 0.0028 0.0028 0.3133
OSAKA -0.1834 *** 0.0659 0.0055 -0.1830 *** 0.0659 0.0056
KOBE -0.1131 0.1018 0.2668 -0.1083 0.1018 0.2874
KYOTO -0.0436 0.0860 0.6122 -0.0519 0.0861 0.5467
CONST 0.1703 0.1261 0.1771 0.1580 0.1262 0.2109
MANUFAC -0.1213 0.1062 0.2535 -0.1341 0.1064 0.2078
WHOLE 0.0733 0.1137 0.5193 0.0631 0.1137 0.5788
RETAIL 0.1730 0.1445 0.2315 0.1529 0.1448 0.2913
REALEST 0.1489 0.2367 0.5295 0.1563 0.2366 0.5090
RESTAU_HOTEL -0.1064 0.2243 0.6352 -0.1055 0.2241 0.6379
SERVICES 0.0242 0.1251 0.8468 0.0222 0.1251 0.8589
VISITINC_OTHER -0.0103 0.0564 0.8555 -0.0075 0.0564 0.8941
VISITINC_PA -0.3421 *** 0.0775 0.0000 -0.3459 *** 0.0774 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1588 0.1604
Number of 1057 1057
Table 7.  Benefit from Soft Information Production
(Dependent variable = QUICK, Ordinary Least Squares)
Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
㩿㪈㪀 㩿㪉㪀Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Intercept 2.7880 *** 0.3490 0.0000 2.7635 *** 0.3444 0.0000
REGIONAL 0.1434 ** 0.0718 0.0461 0.1520 ** 0.0764 0.0468
UNION 0.0726 0.0816 0.3735 0.0667 0.0856 0.4358
SOFT -0.2648 *** 0.0258 0.0000 -0.2746 *** 0.0356 0.0000
SOFT*REGIONAL -0.0111 0.0559 0.8423
SOFT*UNION 0.0828 0.0940 0.3785
AUDIT 0.0867 0.0778 0.2653 0.0873 0.0762 0.2521
LOG(ASSET) -0.0046 0.0308 0.8826 -0.0016 0.0304 0.9580
PERFORMANCE_DS 0.0892 0.0874 0.3074 0.0947 0.0968 0.3281
PERFORMANCE_SD 0.0613 0.1003 0.5416 0.0666 0.1051 0.5264
PERFORMANCE_DD 0.0000 0.1111 0.9999 -0.0084 0.1180 0.9435
NODIVIDEND 0.1602 *** 0.0586 0.0064 0.1588 *** 0.0578 0.0061
FIRMAGE -0.0090 * 0.0053 0.0905 -0.0094 * 0.0055 0.0886
FIRMAGE^2 0.0001 0.0001 0.1114 0.0001 0.0001 0.1242
LOG(EMPLOYEE) -0.0243 0.0381 0.5241 -0.0264 0.0394 0.5027
LISTED -0.3645 ** 0.1431 0.0110 -0.3651 *** 0.1248 0.0035
HOMEOWNER -0.0467 0.1146 0.6835 -0.0456 0.1297 0.7249
CEOAGE 0.0021 0.0027 0.4377 0.0022 0.0028 0.4221
OSAKA -0.0205 0.0622 0.7419 -0.0200 0.0635 0.7524
KOBE -0.0397 0.0961 0.6796 -0.0371 0.0994 0.7087
KYOTO -0.0841 0.0812 0.3010 -0.0899 0.0867 0.3002
CONST 0.2051 * 0.1191 0.0855 0.1987 0.1208 0.1002
MANUFAC 0.0058 0.1008 0.9540 -0.0011 0.1042 0.9919
WHOLE 0.0989 0.1079 0.3594 0.0926 0.1100 0.3999
RETAIL 0.2900 ** 0.1373 0.0349 0.2791 * 0.1431 0.0514
REALEST 0.0998 0.2238 0.6558 0.1054 0.2207 0.6331
RESTAU_HOTEL 0.0630 0.2119 0.7662 0.0644 0.2433 0.7912
SERVICES 0.1155 0.1185 0.3299 0.1153 0.1209 0.3404
VISITINC_OTHER -0.0175 0.0532 0.7415 -0.0156 0.0523 0.7649
VISITINC_PA -0.1605 ** 0.0731 0.0284 -0.1630 ** 0.0689 0.0182
Adjusted R-squared 0.1235 0.1232
Number of 1057 1057
Table 8.  Benefit from Soft Information Production
(Dependent variable = BROAD, Ordinary Least Squares)
Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level. Standard
errors in column (2) are White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
㩿㪈㪀 㩿㪉㪀Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Intercept 2.4402 *** 0.3821 0.0000 2.4275 *** 0.3810 0.0000
REGIONAL -0.1695 ** 0.0764 0.0268 -0.1696 ** 0.0785 0.0310
UNION 0.0194 0.1022 0.8494 0.0176 0.0886 0.8421
SOFT -0.2811 *** 0.0230 0.0000 -0.3009 *** 0.0386 0.0000
SOFT*REGIONAL 0.0303 0.0616 0.6230
SOFT*UNION 0.0624 0.0790 0.4299
AUDIT 0.0068 0.0334 0.8377 0.0089 0.0336 0.7921
LOG(ASSET) 0.1193 0.1089 0.2737 0.1214 0.0956 0.2046
PERFORMANCE_DS -0.0420 0.1098 0.7023 -0.0399 0.1086 0.7130
PERFORMANCE_SD 0.0337 0.1217 0.7823 0.0305 0.1209 0.8011
PERFORMANCE_DD 0.2375 *** 0.0622 0.0001 0.2368 *** 0.0637 0.0002
NODIVIDEND -0.0116 ** 0.0055 0.0345 -0.0121 ** 0.0058 0.0384
FIRMAGE 0.0001 ** 0.0001 0.0376 0.0001 0.0001 0.0525
FIRMAGE^2 -0.0141 0.0416 0.7337 -0.0149 0.0414 0.7197
LOG(EMPLOYEE) -0.2185 0.1394 0.1172 -0.2210 0.1554 0.1554
LISTED -0.1645 ** 0.0703 0.0194 -0.1643 ** 0.0676 0.0153
HOMEOWNER -0.1084 0.1062 0.3080 -0.1057 0.1044 0.3115
CEOAGE -0.0531 0.0869 0.5413 -0.0545 0.0882 0.5367
OSAKA 0.2895 ** 0.1167 0.0133 0.2918 ** 0.1244 0.0192
KOBE 0.0023 0.0029 0.4210 0.0024 0.0029 0.4072
KYOTO 0.0819 0.1313 0.5332 0.0763 0.1290 0.5545
CONST -0.1159 0.1047 0.2687 -0.1223 0.1091 0.2626
MANUFAC -0.0059 0.1124 0.9585 -0.0096 0.1167 0.9343
WHOLE 0.1899 0.1522 0.2123 0.1803 0.1485 0.2250
RETAIL 0.0932 0.1887 0.6213 0.0926 0.2426 0.7028
REALEST 0.0058 0.2546 0.9819 0.0041 0.2298 0.9857
RESTAU_HOTEL 0.0144 0.1223 0.9062 0.0115 0.1286 0.9288
SERVICES -0.0266 0.0568 0.6399 -0.0269 0.0578 0.6423
VISITINC_OTHER -0.1789 ** 0.0738 0.0155 -0.1794 ** 0.0794 0.0241
VISITINC_PA 0.0896 0.0878 0.3079 0.0919 0.0848 0.2789
Adjusted R-squared 0.1231 0.1220
Number of 1056 1056
Table 9.  Benefit from Soft Information Production
(Dependent variable = INEXPENSIVE, Ordinary Least Squares)
Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level. Standard
errors in column (1) are White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
㩿㪈㪀 㩿㪉㪀